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Abstract 
 
The fact of Argentina being one of the first countries to legalize gay marriage has 
been studied al over the world. A not-so-mentioned cause is that, according to survey 
data, discriminatory atitudes towards homosexual people decreased noticeable in 
Argentina since the restoration of democracy in 1983. The evolution of these 
atitudes, considered as a key indicator of the value of tolerance in any society, 
suggests that at least some central components of political culture may change as a 
product of democratic exercise and not only of economic modernization. The article 
also revises the atitudes towards people sufering from AIDS and people with 
criminal records. 
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Democracy and diversity 
 
One of the tasks of democracy consists in guaranteeing the freedom of the various 
groups and individuals to have their own life projects while, at the same time, making 
possible for them to take and feel part of the development of colective life. 
Democracy can in this way be conceived as a particular way of living together which 
simultaneously values and looks for diversity and unity. If society tries to overcome its 
diferences from a unique conception of ‘the good life’, diversity sufers on behalf of 
unity. If, on the contrary, the diferent groups limit themselves to recognize and accept 
their diferences, but they do not commit with the common construction of the 
colective life, society tends to split up in a group of closed communities: it is the unity, 
at this point, the one that sufers on behalf of diversity. Minorities, particularly, wil find 
themselves ‘tolerated’, but not completely ‘integrated’. Democracy, then, means to 
live together – and not merely coexist – in the diference. 
It is inferred from this that democracy is a hard-to-reach form of common life. It is no 
surprise that it has only been able to be accomplished – and in a realy imperfect way 
– in brief and specific moments in human history. In most of the societies which have 
existed, powerful minorities have imposed to others their own conceptions and 
interests. Conversely, in the history of the same democracies, the social and cultural 
pluralism – beyond the one strictly political – has made its own way with dificulty, 
when the majority groups’ views has tried to obstruct or eliminate the ones belonging 
to the minorities that contradicted them. And, in some cases, the same minorities 
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have exposed their demands in terms which meant a permanent breaking-of with the 
rest of the society, blocking, in this way, the road to their own integration. 
Diversity is becoming a central normative value of the 21st century’s democracy, after 
many countries started to experiment it with increasing intensity in the second half of 
the preceding century. As a result of the flows of immigration and the internal 
diversification of the Nation-states itself, they tend more and more to recognize 
themselves as multicultural societies. The new democratic ideal does not ask the 
State for working to create a homogeneous society, deleting the ethnic, linguistic, 
religious or life-style diferences, but it asks for their recognition, value and protection. 
Social and economic equality keeps on being a general aspiration, but it now shares 
its place with cultural democracy (Touraine, 1998). 
The task that democracies have ahead is not easy, as it is shown, in the first place, in 
the fact that this normative ideal – as it happens with al emerging views – moves 
forward with intense opposition and controversy. 
The institution of marriage between people of same sex, which is nowadays in force 
in ten countries – among them Argentina, since its sanction by the Congress in July 
2010 –, keeps on finding opposition in several industrialized democracies and in most 
Latin American ones, although civil unions and other ways of recognition of same-sex 
partnership are more extended. 
In democracies such as France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain, between 60% 
and 80% of citizens support the prohibition for Muslim women to wear a veil in public 
places, including schools, hospitals and government ofices (Pew Research, 2010). In 
April 2011, France put this prohibition legaly into efect. The government based it on 
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the ‘damage’ that the practice produces ‘on those rules which alow the life in 
community, ensure the dignity of the person and equality between sexes.’ The 
organisation Amnesty International considered it, on the contrary, a violation to the 
freedom of religion and expression, but several European countries are studying 
similar measures (1). 
 
Formation and change in political culture 
In issues such as the recognition of same-sex marriage, the use of the Islamic veil 
and other cases associated to the value of diversity, the task of democracy is 
developed in two levels: the sociocultural and the institutional ones. Both dimensions, 
though interdependent, have their own dynamics. 
The political culture belongs to the first dimension and has a deep influence on the 
functioning of the institutions. The political culture approach implies that the beliefs, 
values and paterns of behaviour of ordinary citizens have a crucial influence in the 
course of democracies. The system’s stability, depth and efectiveness depend upon 
the ordinary people – neither only nor mainly on the elites’ doings (Inglehart, 1997; 
Putnam, 1993; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). 
It is not likely that, for example, the political institutions treat and pass a same-sex 
marriage law if a considerable part of the electorate rejects the unions between 
people of same sex. In a similar way, the restrictive measures of freedom of 
expression of Muslim minorities in Europe rely on the weight of intolerance atitudes 
towards these groups in the rest of the society. The most virulent xenophobic 
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atitudes are used to finding concrete political expression in extreme right-wing 
parties, such as the National Front in France. 
Now, the fact that culture has a strong impact on institutions does not mean that there 
is no influence on the other direction. Most scholars assume that between the cultural 
and political-institutional spheres there is causal interaction. But due to the fact that 
culture changes slowly, the key question is to what extent the institutions – 
particularly, the democratic ones – contribute or are able to contribute to that change. 
Is it possible that, for instance, societies with widespread atitudes of discrimination 
towards certain groups become more tolerant as a result of life in democracy? 
In this mater, the experience of the third wave of democratization – the process of 
global spreading of democracy which started in the mid 70s – has given rise to mixed 
interpretations. 
For some scholars, the change’s driving force in political culture is economic 
development (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). The failures of several new democracies, 
the fal of some of them as wel as the persistence of authoritarian regimes obey to, 
from this perspective, an economic development which is stil insuficient. The citizens 
that belong to these societies, according to the argument, logicaly give priority to the 
satisfaction of their material needs, rather than to the satisfaction of higher-level 
needs, as greater freedom of choice and political participation – to which tolerance 
would be also associated. Only when economic modernization – nowadays in 
progress almost everywhere – increases suficiently the material wel-being, the rise 
of these higher priorities – or postmaterialist, in terms of this theory – wil foster 
changes in political culture and, as a consequence of that, institutional changes that 
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improve or deepen the existing democracy, or establish it where it does not yet exist. 
(Also the xenophobic reactions in European countries would be owed to a step 
backwards – possibly temporary – of postmaterialist priorities, generated in a now 
prolonged economic crisis, in the perception of immigration as a threat to the material 
welfare of those societies, and in the feeling of insecurity caused by terrorist atacks). 
Therefore, according to these authors, the political dynamics of the third-wave 
democracies, though it has some efects on political culture, is not enough to change 
it significantly, in contrast with the big forces of economic development and 
technological change. 
When concluding his two-decade study about the diferences of performance 
between the Italian regional governments created at the beginning of the 1970s, 
Putnam (1993) observed likewise that the influence of institutional structure on culture 
was barely visible after twenty years. On the contrary, it was the particular civic 
culture of each region the one that seemed to give its stamp to the way its 
government worked. However, in Putnam’s interpretation, what shaped the regional 
cultures was not economic development. The diferent associative tradition of each 
region – specialy the one from the North in contrast to the one from the South of Italy 
– had derived, after several centuries, in very diferent ‘civic communities’ or ‘social 
capital stocks’, which produced in turn marked contrasts of institutional performance. 
According to the author, the impact of institutional change on culture could only have 
substantial efects in the long term. 
The transitology paradigm, which arose from the myriad of studies on the democratic 
transitions of the third wave, emphasized almost exclusively the calculations and 
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actions displayed by the elites (O’Donnel and Schmiter, 1991). Culture was not 
postulated as a factor of great importance. More explicitly, Schmiter and Karl (1991) 
considered the ‘civic culture’ subject ‘misleading’. The functioning of the new 
democracies would be based on ‘rules of prudence’ applied by rational, antagonistic 
and suspicious actors, rather than on ‘deeply ingrained’ habits of tolerance, trust, and 
so. The later would be a product of democracy, rather than a producer. According to 
this approach, democratic institutions wil be the ones shaping, in the end, a 
democratic political culture – although, according to what Schmiter and Karl seem to 
suggest, they could either work without it. 
Other authors have a diferent viewpoint. Diamond (2009) stresses the fact that al 
democracies – and especialy the new ones – need equilibrium between conflict and 
consensus. Democracy is a system based on the institutionalised competence for 
power, but a too intense competence may destabilise it. The system, then, requires 
mechanisms able to mitigate conflict through consensus. This is the role that the ‘civic 
culture’ may have in the long term – as it was suggested by Almond and Verba (1963) 
half a century ago. 
By making a balance of the third wave at the end of the 20th century, Diamond (1998) 
highlighted that in many of those countries the popular support to democracy relied 
on, beyond the economic problems, a positive evaluation of the political goods 
provided by the system. The citizens especialy valued the new freedoms they 
enjoyed. There were, then, signs of ‘political learning’, based on the experience of 
living under the new system. The cultural and political spheres seemed to have a 
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dynamic of their own, with some degree of autonomy regarding the economic 
dimension. 
In a similar way, Torcal (2008) comes to the conclusion that the ‘unconditional’ 
support to democracy in Spain could be achieved within a few years, after the 
transition was completed, through a process of ‘adult resocialization’ which produced 
a global and permanent change in the Spanish people’s atitudes. According to 
Torcal, this atitudinal shift was a result of the consensus politics adopted by the main 
political actors during the democratic transition and consolidation period, which was 
particularly characterized by the fact of leaving the government ‘issue of regime type’ 
out of the electoral batle. The hypothesis assumes that the political elites’ strategies 
may have a fast and deep impact on, at least, some citizens’ atitudes – in this case 
the support to democracy. 
In more general terms, the concepts of ‘political learning’ and ‘adult resocialization’ 
mean that political culture may change as a product of the purely political experience 
and not only as a result of economic development. 
Nevertheless, since not al the components of political culture have the same 
importance, there arises the question about whether the citizens’ political experience 
is capable of changing or shaping its central political atitudes – not only the 
peripheral ones. 
Inglehart (2003) believes that in our era of global spreading of the democratic ideal, 
citizens from almost al countries – even those with authoritarian regimes – express, 
when being surveyed, a majority support to democracy. According to Inglehart, this 
kind of support is a necessary but not suficient condition for democracy to be able 
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either to emerge, stabilize, deepen or be efective. In order to achieve this, other 
central atitudes would be essential, namely tolerance, trust and especialy liberty 
aspirations (See also Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 and 2009). From the late 20th 
century, the stagnation – and, in some cases, the retreat – of the processes started in 
the third wave – which have led some political scientists to talk about a democratic 
‘recession’ – as wel as the survival of authoritarian regimes seem to acknowledge 
him to be right. 
Isn’t it possible that, in virtue of the same democratic exercise, the citizens learn to be 
more tolerant, to trust each other more, and to wish more freedom? The answer to 
this question depends on the one we give to the folowing question: does the 
individual’s political socialization finish essentialy in the early stages of life? Or is it 
feasible that some central atitudes change during adulthood due to learning? The 
panel’s studies, based on repeated interviews to the same people at diferent 
moments of time, say that what prevails is atitudinal stability. Neither are the results 
completely conclusive nor there are many studies of this type, which need to be 
prolonged for decades (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). 
It is not infrequent that, for instance, the government and the political system try to 
promote within the society greater levels of tolerance towards minorities or groups 
that sufer discrimination. In several cases, these afected groups and the ones who 
support them normaly develop, through civil society’s organizations, actions that 
intend to change the atitudes of defined population segments or of the majority of the 
citizens. In a more general way, a wide variety of government and civil organizations 
promote various types of causes with goals which assume a change in the atitudes – 
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quite deep-rooted at times – of the sectors which are the target of their campaigns. It 
is the case of the ecological, pacifist, human rights associations, and the like. Are 
these eforts forced to achieve superficial changes or, in either case, to activate or 
reinforce the support of those who already have a favourable predisposition? 
This type of actions addressed to specific aims are integrated to the more general 
process of public opinion formation, in which a broad group of social and political 
actors with diverging viewpoints take part, and in which the media decisively 
participate. Conceived as a mechanism of ‘colective deliberation’, this process – if 
working reasonably wel – can promote, according to Page and Shapiro (1992), the 
people’s ‘political education’. From this perspective, political leaders, experts, 
government oficials, social movements, and journalists can contribute to the citizens’ 
education providing information and interpretations about the issues of public interest. 
It is true that the preferences which are formed in this way in general tend to be 
consistent with the individuals’ previous values and beliefs, since people find 
themselves likely to be exposed to the messages that agree with their points of view, 
to perceive and to retain from them the elements which are also concordant, and to 
interpret the information within their acquaintances, with whom they have many things 
on common. However, the research on atitudes has set out various mechanisms by 
which these can change as a result of new data and of social influence processes (De 
Montmolin, 1985; Perlof, 1991). 
Heifetz (1997) correctly observes that, in times of fast changes, entire groups or 
societies have the need to learn new methods to solve problems or crisis which are 
framed in complicated and interactive systems. He suggests a set of strategies which 
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political and social leaders can apply in order to promote and provide such learning. 
The strategies are based on giving people back what Heifetz cals the ‘adaptive work’. 
Since several social crisis or problems involve inconsistencies between reality and 
people’s values, or even a conflict of values, this work usualy requires changes in the 
later. 
To summarize this section, we can postulate three main processes of formation and 
change in political culture: 1) the cultural tradition and specific historical trajectory of 
every society; 2) economic development and technological change; 3) political 
experience and learning. In order to figure out the real influence each one has, it is 
necessary to cary out empirical research. 
 
Tolerance among Argentineans 
The analysis of the evolution of some tolerance indicators among Argentineans since 
the restoration of democracy wil enable us to clear up a bit the discussion which was 
set out above. Both the postmodernization theory – developed especialy by Inglehart 
and, more recently, also by Welzel – and the social capital theory, whose main author 
is Putnam, consider tolerance as one of the central components of the democratic 
political culture (2). 
It is clear that, as it happened when dealing with the mater of diversity, tolerance is 
not enough to make democracy work. Trust among people – another central element 
highlighted in both theories – contributes to unity. In their most recent works, Inglehart 
and Welzel (see, especialy, 2005) consider liberty aspirations as the most important 
component in democratic culture. To the three aspects already shown, they add elite-
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chalenging, self-directed participation, among whose main expressions we can find 
petitions and demonstrations. The four of them are integrated in an interelated 
system caled self-expression values (3). 
Tolerance is particularly interesting for us since it has not taken part in the political 
tradition of Argentineans. Briefly after democracy was restored, Portantiero (1984) 
wrote that, although immigration made Argentina an egalitarian society, it was not 
enough to ‘shape a democratic political culture, self-sustained in tolerance’ (page 
142). Cavarozzi (1983) did not thought of the outlook which was marking the 
beginning of the new-born democracy as ‘so promising’, since at the moment of the 
coup d’état which took place in 1976 ‘the Argentinean society was deeply imbued in 
antidemocratic values and habits: the cult of violence, (…) the lack of tolerance to 
dissident behaviours and ideas and critical thinking, and disdain for consensus’ 
(pages 69-70). 
Our analysis wil focus on the trajectories folowed by three specific indicators, 
oriented to tolerance towards homosexuals, people sufering from AIDS and 
individuals with criminal records. The selection does not only come from the 
availability of time series of data about these indicators for relatively long periods. It 
also relies on the fact that the contrasts and similarities of its courses enable us to 
reach to significant hypothesis about some key mechanisms which seem to influence 
the increase and decrease of tolerance. 
Moreover, as it is one of the most discriminated groups in most countries, atitudes 
towards homosexuals are considered one of the best ‘acid tests’ of tolerance within a 
society (Inglehart, 2003). In international comparative studies, tolerance towards 
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homosexuals shows a strong positive correlation with democracy’s stability and 
efectiveness. 
When examining the reasons for Argentina being one of the first countries in the 
world – the second in the Americas – to include in its own civil code the figure of 
same-sex marriage, Corrales and Pecheni (2010) particularly highlight the existence 
of a catholic population which in its majority is not active, the absence of religious 
parties or parties closely related to churches, the tradition of importing legal rules and 
the rich internal legislative agenda associated with human rights. 
But at the same time we can see a cultural long-term change associated with the 
spreading of tolerance atitudes in the Argentinean society, which is possible to check 
over the last three decades. There are, however, particular cases which deviate from 
that general trend – and which are also instructive about the mechanisms at stake. 
In order to measure tolerance, a list of social groups is shown to the person surveyed, 
and he/she is asked whether he/she would not like to have any of such groups as 
neighbours. Figure 1 shows the evolution in the percentage of population who 
mentioned the three groups analysed in this article. The data from the period 1984-
2006 represent the whole country and they arise from our calculations which were 
taken from the World Values Survey’s databases coordinated by Inglehart. The 
percentages of the years 2008 and 2010 belong, respectively, to the region of Gran 
La Plata and the city of Junín, both located in the province of Buenos Aires (4). These 
come from two research projects about political culture directed by the author of this 
article (5). 
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Figure 1 – Evolution of Tolerance Indicators in Argentina 
Groups that people would not like to have as neighbours 
% of population
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1984 1991 1995 1999 2006 Gran La
Plata 2008
Junín 2010
Homosexuals
People sufering 
from AIDS
People with
criminal records
 
 
Source: 1984.2006: own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
2008 and 2010: Research Projects PID-P001 - Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) and P-0415 - 
Universidad Nacional del Noroeste de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (UNNOBA). N: 1984=1.005; 
1991=1.002; 1995=1.079; 1999=1.280; 2006=1.002; 2008=400; 2010=400.  
 
We can clearly see a deep and sustained drop in the proportion of Argentineans who 
pick homosexuals and people sufering from AIDS, which is a trend that reflects a 
noticeable rise of tolerance in a term of two decades. In 1991, the time series’ starting 
point for both groups, 39% of Argentineans did not want to have homosexual 
neighbours. The figure had dropped to 16% in 2006 and in our survey studies it had 
further declined to 5% in Gran La Plata (2008) and to 9% in Junín (2010). This 
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significant change is the background of the same-sex marriage law’s treatment and 
approval in the middle of 2010. 
Atitudes towards people sufering from AIDS show a similar course. The percentage 
of people who did not want them as neighbours drops from 32% in 1991 to 7% in 
2006. In 2008 and 2010, it was 4% in Gran La Plata and 6% in Junín. 
The phenomenon observed in relation with people with criminal records is totaly 
diferent. In that case, tolerance tends to decrease. While in 1984, 36% of 
Argentineans pointed at this group, in 1999 – last point in the national series – that 
figure went up to 43%. In 2008, 40% of people from La Plata picked this group and in 
2010, 46% of people from Junín did the same. The background here is undoubtedly 
the rise of the issue of insecurity and crime in the public agenda. 
This later fact is significant since there are just a few social groups or categories with 
so high levels of discrimination. For example, 36% of Argentineans pointed at the 
alcoholics in 2006, and 31% of people from La Plata pointed at the drug-addicts in 
2008. With not at al insignificant, but much lower figures, there appear Korean and 
Chinese people – which record 12% in Junín in 2010 and 9% in Gran La Plata in 
2008 –, while Muslims record 6% in 1999 al over the country. 
As regards the international aspect, tolerance towards certain social groups is 
associated with the particular history and culture of each society, but also to its 
economic development levels. The postmodernization theory underlines especialy 
this point. According to this approach, economic modernization is closely associated 
with stable and efective democracy through the changes it produces in culture and 
social structure. 
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It is necessary to refer back to this theory – which approaches democracy from the 
long-term social change perspective – both due to its high degree of formalization and 
predictive power and due to the extraordinary database – the World Values Survey – 
on which it supports: 350 thousand interviewees with standardized questionnaires 
from 1981 to 2008, belonging to more than 90 countries from every continent. 
As diferent authors have highlighted from the 1950s, economic modernization 
generates a set of transformations which are favourable to the emergence of 
democracy. The extension of wealth reduces social distances; education is 
generalised; the mass media’s development provides everyone with information 
about Politics, which in the past used to be kept only for the elites; the citizens, who 
have at their disposal more education, information and organisation skils acquired in 
more and more sophisticated workplaces, develop a greater capacity for political and 
civic action. 
The theory which we are dealing with particularly studies the pro-democratic cultural 
changes which economic development produces when entering its most advanced 
phase, i.e., the postindustrial society (Inglehart, 1997 and 1990; Inglehart and Welzel, 
2005). The main mechanism which links economic transformation with value change 
is based on the Maslow’s hypothesis about the individuals’ needs, which are 
organised in a hierarchy. Survival needs – both physiological and physical-safety – 
must be reasonably satisfied before people give priority to higher-level needs, such 
as esteem, belonging and self-expression. Once development has suficiently 
improved material wel-being, in a way which a growing number of individuals take 
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their survival for granted and develop a sense of security, materialist priorities wil 
start to lose ground to postmaterialist ones. 
Now, since the individuals’ personality nucleus – including their basic values – is 
shaped in their pre-adult life and remains stable from that moment on, the fact of an 
individual’s priorities being materialist or postmaterialist wil depend upon the degree 
of subjective security or insecurity with which he/she grew up. 
The notion of a needs hierarchy, combined with this socialization hypothesis, implies 
that if a society moves forward in terms of a sustained economic development, young 
and old generations wil have different value priorities. The change in society’s values 
– from the materialist priorities to the postmaterialist ones – is going to be produced 
as younger generations replace the old ones. There wil be short-term fluctuations: an 
economic crisis wil cause a general and temporary drop of postmaterialist priorities, 
but the long-term trend wil not be altered, unless society reverts its material course 
permanently. 
The fact of perceiving the own existence as secure or insecure has a wider impact on 
a broader set of cultural norms: Politics, religion, family, work, lifestyles are deeply 
afected. The value of the new and exotic – and therefore the tolerance towards 
individuals and groups seen as such – is one aspect of this cultural shift. 
The change oriented towards the postmodern values – of which the postmaterialist 
values are part – became visible in several countries from the 1960s. The young 
people at that time transformed habits, chalenged authority and asked for a more 
participative democracy. Materialist and postmaterialist priorities have been 
measured in surveys from the 1970s and make up a wel-documented process. 
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According to Inglehart, postmodern values are essentialy pro-democratic. 
Industrialisation may or may not lead to democracy, but advanced economic 
development, which makes this value system emerge, makes highly probable its 
establishment or deepening. Aspirations of freedom, individual autonomy or self-
expression, which arise from the experienced feeling of safety at early age, are the 
core of such system. Existential insecurity leads the individuals to take refuge in 
relatively closed groups made up of similar people who tend to mistrust and 
discriminate strangers. On the contrary, certainty leads us to see the world as a safe 
place, to trust others and to see them as intrinsicaly valuable individuals. In this way, 
generalised trust and tolerance arise. People establish social links which are not 
motivated by group conformity, but by their free choice. Peculiar ways of civil and 
political organisation emerge, such as elite-chalenging, self-directed political activity. 
Here, we wil not go deep into al these relationships, but we must investigate whether 
tolerance among Argentineans is or is not related to postmaterialist priorities. The 
most widely used indicator to measure the postmaterialist/materialist dimension is an 
index which arises from showing the interviewees a list of four goals which the 
country should set for the next ten years, and ask him/her which one, in his/her 
opinion, is the most important as wel as which one folows it. The objectives are: 
maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government 
decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech. People who 
choose participation in government decisions and freedom of speech – both related to 
freedom aspirations – are classified as postmaterialist; the ones who pick order and 
prices are materialist; the others are considered mixed. 
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The evolution of this index in Argentina, since 1984, is shown in Figure 2. The 
percentage of postmaterialists traces out a parabola. In 1984 it is 13%, goes up to a 
maximum of 30% in 1995, and goes down to 14% in 2006. The proportion of 
materialists has an inverse trajectory in a concave way. It goes from 33% in 1984 
down to a minimum of 16% in 1995 and increases again up to 31% in 2006. The 
percentage of mixed people – which combines a postmaterialist and a materialist goal 
– remains constant around 55%. In our surveys, in 2008 the society from Gran La 
Plata appears a bit more postmaterialist than the previous national average, which is 
similar to the one registered in the city of Junín in 2010. 
 
Figure 2 –
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1984 1991 1995 1999 2006 Gran La
Plata 2008
Junín 2010
Postmaterialist Mixed Materialist
 Postmaterialists and Materialists in Argentina 
% of population 
 
Source: 1984.2006: own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
2008 and 2010: Research Projects PID-P001 (UNLP) and P-0415 (UNNOBA). 
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According to the theory’s predictions, we should expect the postmaterialists to be 
more tolerant – and the materialists to be less tolerant – towards the diferent social 
groups, while the mixed groups are in the middle of both. From the transnational 
surveys we can see that, for instance, postmaterialists are more open-up to 
homosexuals in almost every society. We wil immediately prove that, indeed, this is 
the case. However, we can henceforward notice that the trajectories folowed by our 
three tolerance indicators do not coincide with the one folowed by the 
postmaterialism index. In Figure 3 we can see the evolution of the percentage of 
Argentineans – classified according to the postmaterialism index – who would not like 
homosexuals ‘as neighbours’. 
 
Figure 3 – Argentina: People who would not like homosexuals as neighbours  
% of population
Postmaterialists
Mixed
Materialists
0%
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20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1991 1995 1999 2006
 
 
Source: Own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
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Three aspects from the graphic are especialy noticeable: a) the tolerance systematic 
diferences among postmaterialist, materialist and mixed groups in the period from 
1991 to 1999, which coincide with the theory’s predictions; b) the continuous 
decrease of the percentage that discriminates homosexuals in al three categories; c) 
the virtual disappearance of tolerance diferences between postmaterialist and mixed 
groups in 2006 while the materialist group being just slightly less tolerant. In 1991, 
53% of materialists did not want to have homosexual neighbours, opposed to 26% of 
postmaterialists. In 2006, the figures had reduced down to 20% of materialists and 
16% of postmaterialists. This means that the postmaterialists who discriminate 
homosexuals dropped by 40% while the materialists by 63%. 
It is absolutely clear, then, that the substantial fal of the percentage of Argentineans 
who discriminate homosexuals is not explained by a rise in postmaterialism or a 
reduction of materialism in the long term. The postmaterialist / materialist dimension 
folows, as we have seen, a curvilinear trajectory, which in 2006 ended up making the 
proportions of postmaterialists and materialists go back to the levels of 1984. On the 
contrary, the percentage of population who discriminates homosexuals drops 
constantly, and it also does so in the three categories of the postmaterialist / 
materialist dimension. 
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Figure 4 – Argentina: People who would not like  
people suffering from AIDS as neighbours 
% of population
Postmaterialists
Mixed
Materialists
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20%
30%
40%
50%
1991 1995 1999 2006
 
 
Source: Own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
 
The same phenomenon has taken place in the case of the atitudes towards people 
sufering from AIDS, as we can see in Figure 4. In 1991, 44% of materialists and 19% 
of postmaterialists discriminated this group; in 2006, only 9% of materialists and 4% 
of postmaterialists did so. It is remarkable that both groups have dropped by 79%. 
The atitude towards people with criminal records folows a diferent, but not less 
suggestive, patern (Figure 5). Here, the points to highlight are: a) discrimination 
increases in the three categories of the postmaterialist/materialist dimension; b) there 
are clear tolerance diferences among the three categories, according to the theory’s 
predictions; c) but the increase of intolerance among postmaterialists (48% between 
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the starting and ending points) is much higher that the one registered among 
materialists (25%) and mixed (23%). In 1984, 39% of materialists and 26% of 
postmaterialists did not want neighbours with criminal records; in 1999, the figures 
were 49% and 38%, respectively. 
 
Figure 5 – Argentina: People who would not like  
people with criminal records as neighbours 
% of population
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Source: Own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
 
In our survey studies carried out in Junín and Gran La Plata, we can find similar 
paterns to the ones found in the national level as regards the tolerance diferences 
among postmaterialists, materialists and mixed (Figure 6). In Gran La Plata, these 
diferences are realy slight – although they do not disappear – for homosexuals and 
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people with AIDS. In both communities, however, postmaterialists discriminate people 
with criminal records a lot less than materialists do. 
 
Figure 6 – Junín 2010 and Gran La Plata 2008 
Groups that people would not like ‘as neighbours’ 
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Source: Research Projects PID-P001 (UNLP) and P-0415 (UNNOBA). 
 
The task of democracy 
The postmaterialist / materialist dimension reflects the impact of economic 
development on the cultural sphere. And this, undoubtedly, constitutes a factor of 
enormous importance when analysing the emergence, stability, depth and 
efectiveness of democracy. 
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In his historical assessment about democracies in Latin America, Rouquié (2011) has 
pointed out the way in which those ‘non-tocquevilian republics’ – in which the 
‘equality of conditions’, which according to De Tocquevile was a feature of a 
democratic society, has never prevailed – have always shown the tension existing 
between their long tradition of the principles of freedom and pluralism – no others 
were the ones proclaimed in order to legitimize the independence movements – and 
their ‘non-egalitarian and hierarchical, eminently adverse for democratic practice’ 
social structures (page 346). If democracy is nowadays moving forward in the region 
– Rouquié adds –, it is ‘because societies are transforming’. They are more urbanized 
and secularized, class divisions are less pronounced, exclusion is decreasing, 
education and information are spreading (ibid.). 
But modernization, although it is probably the most important force, does not explain 
it al. On one hand, also cultural tradition exerts influence. In this way, Rouquié points 
out that, despite the turbulences which distinguish the two centuries of existence in 
Latin American countries, ‘the flame of democracy never extinguished’. On the other 
hand, democracy is also ‘an uncertain, complex cultural construction which moves 
forward by trial and error’ (page 345). 
Our analysis about the evolution of tolerance in Argentina, though only approached in 
some indicators, shows that the task of cultural construction of democracy has 
tangible efects. In the case of homosexuals and people sufering from AIDS, the 
increase of tolerance is clearly related to a process of colective deliberation – an 
essential part of democratic exercise since the restoration of Argentinean institutions 
in 1983 – which gradualy changed the discriminatory atitudes towards such groups. 
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Postmodernization theory captures an important aspect of reality, as it is reflected on 
the systematic diferences that are present in the tolerance atitudes we can see 
among postmaterialists, materialists and mixed. Likewise, in another work (Jorge, 
2010, pages 173-176), we have pointed out that the successive Argentinean 
generations difer in the relative weight of postmaterialists and materialists, folowing, 
in general terms, the theory’s predictions. In the period between 1984 and 2006, 
covered by the World Values Survey, the cohort of Argentineans who were born 
between 1970 and 1979 is more postmaterialist than the group born between 1950 
and 1959, which is, in turn, more postmaterialist than the cohort born between 1940 
and 1949. This age-decreasing postmaterialism patern continues with the 
Argentineans who were born in the 30s, 20s and 10s. The 1960-1969 cohort is the 
most postmaterialist of al, until 1995, but later it is less postmaterialist than the ones 
who were born in the periods 1970-1979 and 1950-1959. 
As we can predict, the diferent Argentinean generations show tolerance diferences, 
which partly reflect the weight postmaterialists and materialists have. In Figure 7, 
which ilustrates this fact in the case of homosexuals, the youngest Argentineans –
though the lines intersect at some points – tend to be more tolerant than the older 
generations. However, the percentage of those who would not like to have 
homosexual neighbours decreases throughout the period in almost every cohort. 
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Figure 7 – Argentina: People who would not like  
homosexuals ‘as neighbours’ by Age Cohorts 
% of population
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Source: Own calculations for the whole country from the World Values Survey’s database. 
 
From the graphic, we can clearly see that the increase of tolerance towards 
homosexuals is not explained mainly by generational replacement – we could prove 
the same for people sufering from AIDS. The central mechanism, unforeseen in the 
postmodernization theory, seems to be what we have caled ‘adult resocialization’ or 
‘political learning’. 
We have applied the procedure suggested by Inglehart (1990, page 99) to the data in 
Figure 7 in order to calculate the magnitude of value change owed to generational 
replacement (6). Taking 1991 as starting point, when eliminating the influence of the 
younger generations, the proportion of Argentineans who would not like to have 
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homosexual neighbours increases from 16% to 20% in 2006. In other words, even 
without the natural replacement of the successive generations, between 1991 and 
2006 the percentage of Argentineans that discriminate homosexuals would have 
dropped by 19 percentage points, from 39% to 20%. Actualy, it dropped by 23 
percentage points – from 39% to 16% -, i.e., just 4 more. This 4% represents al the 
contribution that generational replacement has made to the increase of tolerance 
towards homosexuals. The rest must be ascribed to adult resocialization. 
The indicators analysed in this chapter point out that the process of ‘colective 
deliberation’ has an important role in this learning process. Since the restoration of 
democracy, the public deliberation on the issue of homosexuality, though it has 
generated several controversies, gradualy tended to fight discriminatory atitudes, 
especialy in the media and the policies implemented by the government. Moreover, 
civil organisations and groups defending the Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and 
Transsexuals’ rights (LGBT) developed an intense agenda based on transnational 
legislation and the precedents of the country itself as regards human rights, as wel as 
in a legal and legislative action strategy which proved its efectiveness. 
The support of the government party to the aspirations of LGBT groups ended up 
making Argentina become one of the first nations to legalize same-sex marriage. 
Probably, in the sphere of human rights, political learning in Argentina may have 
created appropriate conditions to move forward in that direction. At least in this case, 
the fact of having undergone a military dictatorship may represent an advantage, as 
long as the society has learned anything from that experience. 
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The short list of countries which have passed the same-sex marriage so far points out 
an interpretation which coincides with the preceding arguments. The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Canada, Sweden, Norway and Iceland are among the world more advanced 
nations as regards economic and human development. Except for the particular case 
of Iceland, they are likewise among the societies in which postmaterialist values are 
more widespread. In the other four countries – Spain, Portugal, Argentina and South 
Africa – materialist values prevail to a greater extent. But the three first countries 
underwent the experience of long and bloody dictatorships, and the fourth one, had 
an apartheid regime which likewise violated the most basic human rights. 
The issue of AIDS has also been object of coherent government policies, informative 
campaigns and reasonable discussion in Argentina. It is about a mater in which 
prejudices based on the lack of information can be changed by means of a good 
public debate. 
On the contrary, the process of colective deliberation about crime and insecurity 
never worked appropriately in Argentina. It has sufered from opaque information, 
confusing debate and swinging public policies. Growing fear of crime – a result of 
both the real increase of insecurity and people’s confusion – and the ‘tough on’ 
rhetoric prevalent during long periods have naturaly tended to feed the intolerance 
atitudes. 
Although the deliberative mechanisms of democracy may fail – as the case of people 
with criminal records reveals –, political learning seems to be able, in some 
circumstances, of becoming a transforming force of the people’s political culture. 
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Footnotes: 
(1) See, for example, The Guardian: ‘Ful-face veils outlawed as France spels out 
controversial niqab ban’, 3 March, 2011. CNN.com: ‘French senate approves burqa 
ban’, September 14, 2010. El País: ¡Cómo legisla Europa sobre el velo’ [How Europe 
legislates on the veil], 20 April, 2010. 
(2) For a general explanation of these theories, see Jorge, 2010, especialy Chapter 
2.  
(3) In addition to trust and tolerance, Putnam adds civic engagement, political 
equality, solidarity, and civil associations (1993, pages 86-91). Other social capital 
scholars also highlight respect for the law and civic norms. Some democracy theorists 
consider that the main cultural elements are unconditional support to the system – 
i.e., its legitimacy – and confidence in institutions.  
(4) The city of La Plata is capital of the Province of Buenos Aires, the most populated 
state and the one with more economic weight in Argentina. The Gran La Plata region, 
which comprises the city and the two neighbouring towns of Berisso and Ensenada, 
has a population of 750 thousand inhabitants. The city of Junín, the most important 
one in the northwest of the same province, is located in the core of the intensive 
agricultural area of the country, and has 86 thousand inhabitants.  
(5) The Projects are PID-P001 ‘Comunicación y Cultura Política en la Región del 
Gran La Plata’ [Communication and Political Culture in the Gran La Plata Region] 
(Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 2006-2008) and P-0415 ‘La Cultura Política en el 
Noroeste Bonaerense’ [Political Culture in the northwest of Buenos Aires] 
(Universidad Nacional del Noroeste de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 2008-2011).  
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(6) The procedure consists in keeping the proportion of interviewees of each cohort 
fixed over the total amount of interviewees registered in 1991. In 1995, 1999 and 
2006, the new cohorts are left out and the observed percentage that discriminates 
homosexuals in each of the other cohorts is multiplied by the weight of these cohorts 
in 1991. 
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